Aggregate United States plane losses during the course of the Pacific war, not including training losses in the United States, were approximately 27,000 planes. Of these losses 8,700 were on combat missions; the remainder were training, ferrying and other noncombat losses. Of the combat losses over 60 percent were to antiaircraft fire. http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm
In the attack by Allied air power, almost 2,700,000 tons of bombs were dropped, more than 1,440,000 bomber sorties and 2,680,000 fighter sorties were flown. The number of combat planes reached a peak of some 28,000 and at the maximum 1,300,000 men were in combat commands. The number of men lost in air action was 79,265 Americans and 79,281 British. [Note: All RAF statistics are preliminary or tentative.] More than 18,000 American and 22,000 British planes were lost or damaged beyond repair. http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm0016名無しさん@1周年2018/01/12(金) 23:29:52.03ID:0mP4M/gJ0 当時の日本は国や民族の為に 命を懸けることが美徳とされた時代なんだから 志願だったと言っても何も不思議なことではない 0017名無しさん@1周年2018/01/12(金) 23:30:25.36ID:fZwBQ1n80>>7 平均寿命7日間、セミなみの命しかないナチパイロットがどうかしたか?
もし(万が一仮に)日本が攻撃するためのより十分な力を集結させ、維持し続けることができたなら (そんなことは実際にはありえないが)日本は私たちを撤退させるか戦略を変更させることができたかもしれない Had the Japanese been able to sustain an attack of greater power and concentration they might have been able to cause us to withdraw or to revise our strategic plans.
1945年3月までには日本本土への直接の空襲を優先することにより 日本の神風隊の空軍力は減少し、日本の全艦隊は沈没か編成できなくなり 海外貿易は破壊しつくされ、陸軍の大部分が孤立化した。そして日本経済を真綿で絞めるような絞殺が始まった このように軍事力が消滅していった理由は次のように分析されている >By March 1945, prior to heavy direct air attack on the Japanese home islands, the Japanese air forces had been reduced to Kamikaze forces, her fleet had been sunk or immobilized, her merchant marine decimated, large portions of her ground forces isolated, and the strangulation of her economy well begun. What happened to each of these segments of Japan's vanishing war potential is analyzed in the following sections.
日本の工業的ポテンシャルは最大でもアメリカの10%であった。日本の研究や技術デザインは 純粋な模倣ではなかったが、新しい分野での信頼できる装備の開発力は低かった 日本のレーダーや通信技術は貧弱だった。日本は十分な戦艦や護衛艦を建造できなかった 日本は適切な離発着場を建設できなかった。日本は常にオイルが不足しており、妨げとなっていた。 日本の対空は時代遅れの旧式だった。日本は民間人のために十分なシェルターを経済的な問題で 準備できなかった。日本は工場を分散させることもできなければ破壊された工場を 修理することもできなかった。日本は工場の修理よりも移転を選択した。しかし 効果的に分散させるためには資力が不十分だったからだ >Japan's industrial potential was approximately 10 percent of that of the United States. Even though her research and technical design work was not purely imitative, her ability to develop reliable operating equipment in the new fields was low. Her radar and communications equipment was weak. She could not build sufficient ships or escort vessels. She lacked construction equipment to build adequate airfields. She was always hampered by a lack of oil. Her antiaircraft was outmoded. She could not economically afford to build adequate shelters for her population. She could not both disperse her industry and also repair damaged plants. She chose dispersal rather than repair, but she had insufficient means even to disperse effectively. 0030名無しさん@1周年2018/01/12(金) 23:37:37.94ID:Qvq76NuK0 航空特攻による撃沈艦 フィリピン戦 25隻 護衛空母セント・ロー オマニー・ベイ 駆逐艦アブナ・リード マハン レイド 輸送駆逐艦ワード 掃海駆逐艦ロング 駆潜艇744号 掃海艇パルマー ハビ 魚雷艇PT-323 PT-300 戦車揚陸艦LST-472 LST-738 LST-460 LST-749 LST-1075 中型揚陸艦LSM-20 LSM-318 輸送艦ウィリアムSラッド リューイスLダイチ ジョンバーク 歩兵揚陸艇 LCI1065 タンカー ボーキュバイン 艦隊曳船ソノ
As soon as they appeared, then, Kamikazes revealed their power to force significant changes in Allied naval planning and operations, despite relatively small numbers. Clearly, like the antishipping cruise missile of a later era, the Kamikaze had the potential to influence events all out of proportion to its actual strength.
MILITARY HOSTILE NON-HOSTILE ACTION DEATHS WOUNDED DEATHS World War II (1941-45) Total 293,121 670,846 115,185 European Theater 185,179 498,948 66,805 Pacific Theater 107,903 171,898 48,380 Korean War (1950-53) 33,739 103,284 2,835 Vietnam War (1961-73) 47,434 153,303 10,786 Iraq War (2001-2016) 3,519 32,246 965 http://www.tavvntc.org/cost.htm